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Abstract
The end of the Cold War and the apparent stability of the contemporary international system, in which the
probability of a major war is at its lowest for centuries, have spurred a lively debate on the causes of peace. One
of the most popular explanations is based on the classic liberal statement that economic interdependence reduces
political conflict. Globalisation, narrowly defined as the increase in the quantity and quality of international
economic exchanges experienced in the last few years, would then be one of the main reasons for international
political stability. Even at the regional level, therefore, the increase in economic intercourse should bring, as a
welcome political externality, the amelioration of international conflict. This view posits, for instance, that the
emergence of a «zone of peace» within Western Europe has been brought about by the creation of a common
market which has created a powerful incentive to avoid political conflict. Or that in other areas, such as Latin
America, the recent increase in regional stability would rest on the launch of Mercosur and the greater
interdependence that it has brought about. The hypothesis is that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) facilitate
economic interdependence, which in turn facilitate political stability. In this paper we apply this hypothesis to
the African case where a significant number of RTAs has been created in the last decades. Expectations of
increased political stability have not, however, been confirmed. This does not necessarily undermine the general
proposition of a positive correlation between interdependence and peace, but it does suggest that the relationship
between the two elements may be more complicated than often acknowledged. On the one hand, African RTAs
may simply not have produced the necessary level of trade and investment for a significant modification of
political preferences. On the other hand, interdependence may be a necessary condition for peace, but it may also
be insufficient, as its full impact on political preferences may require specific domestic institutions.
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endeavour, the final draft has been compiled by the authors according to the following division: Filippo
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1INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War and the apparent stability of the contemporary international system,
in which the probability of a major war is at its lowest for centuries, have spurred a lively
public and scholarly debate on the causes of peace. One of the most popular explanations is
based on the classic liberal statement that economic interdependence reduces political
conflict. Globalisation, narrowly defined as the unprecedented increase in the quantity and
quality of international economic exchanges which has been experienced in the last few years,
would then be one of the main reasons for international political stability. Even at the regional
level, therefore, the increase in economic intercourse should bring, as a welcome political
externality, the amelioration of international conflict, based either on political development or
on the resolution of outstanding issues for the sake of increased economic prosperity. This
view posits that the emergence of a «zone of peace» within Western Europe has been brought
about by the creation of a common market which has created a powerful incentive to avoid
political conflict. According to this view, also in other areas, such as Latin America, the
recent increase in regional stability would rest on the launch of the Mercosur and the increase
of interdependence that it has brought about. The hypothesis would therefore be that an
increase in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) would facilitate economic interdependence,
which would then facilitate political stability.
This paper applies this hypothesis to the African case, where a significant number of RTAs
has been created. The expectations of increased political stability have not, however, been
confirmed. This does not necessarily undermine the general proposition of a positive
correlation between interdependence and peace, but it does suggest that the relationship
between the two elements may be more complicated than often acknowledged. On the one
hand, the relationship may hold only when the first element has reached a critical level, while
at lower values it does not represent a sufficient reason for political change. In other words,
African RTAs may simply not have produced the necessary level of trade and investment for
a significant modification of political preferences. On the other hand, interdependence may be
a necessary condition for peace, but it may also be insufficient, as its full impact on political
preferences may require specific domestic institutions. Strong and democratic institutions
may be necessary to ensure that the general interest in peaceful economic exchanges between
neighbours prevails over the specific interests of economic and political pressure groups
which may not coincide with either peaceful politics or free market economics. Furthermore,
there may also be requirements at the international level. The relationship between
interdependence and its political effects may involve conflict as well as cooperation, because
it may expose the vulnerability of states to international economic processes and it may lead
to their attempts to reduce it by political means. A certain amount of prior political stability
may therefore be necessary for the “commercial peace” to operate.
The analysis therefore leads to the conclusion that simplistic strategies of mere
encouragement of RTAs in the hope of producing significant economic or political effects are
likely to be either irrelevant or even counterproductive. What is needed is a more complex
approach dealing with domestic as well as international reform and with political as well as
economic issues. The same type of international agreement which has worked in Europe or
Latin America may in fact fail in a completely different context, where much more is needed
in order to provide a suitable environment for economic interdependence to develop, and for
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various sections. Firstly, the liberal hypothesis will be spelled out. Secondly, its main
theoretical weaknesses will be summarised. Sections 3 and 4 analyse the shortcomings of the
African environment in terms of economic structure, domestic institutions and international
politics. Section 5 considers the growing political and military role of regional economic
organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the last section will draw the conclusions and
the policy implications.
1. The Standard Liberal Argument
The idea that free trade brings peace is at least as old as economic liberalism itself and it
therefore rests on a distinguished tradition. The revolutionary reasoning exposed by Smith
and Ricardo behind the concept of comparative advantage also lies behind the incentives and
mutual advantages of abandoning political conflict for economic interdependence (Irwin
(1996)). Montesquieu was one of the first philosophers to recognise that «the natural effect of
commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations which trade with each other become mutually
dependent: if one has an interest in buying the other has an interest in selling and all
associations are based on mutual need» (Montesquieu (1748/1965)). The American radical,
Tom Paine, also believed, among others, that «if commerce were allowed to operate at the
universal level of which it is capable, it would extirpate the system of war» (Paine (1995)).
The zenith of this school of thought was reached with the Manchester school, when Richard
Cobden could argue that the unprecedented era of peace in the mid-XIX Century was due to
the unprecedented levels of economic interdependence brought abut by the free trade doctrine
after the repeal of the Corn Laws (Cain (1979)). Similarly, at the turn of the Century, liberals
such as Sir Norman Angell were arguing that, given the high levels of economic
interdependence, the idea that war could be profitable had become a Great Illusion (Angell
(1908)). Analysing the same period in his classic study, Polanyi also subscribed to the idea
that peace and interdependence in the XIX Century were inextricably linked (Polanyi (1957)).
Economic interdependence would thus facilitate political cooperation for three main reasons.
Firstly, it would provide a more efficient and less dangerous way to accumulate benefits and
resources, contributing to the obsolescence of war as a means for profit. In more recent times,
the spread of industrialisation and trade liberalisation has been highlighted as a crucial factor
in the diminished importance of territory for the accumulation of wealth and power, thereby
reducing the incentives for armed expansion. Although this does not remove all the incentives
for political conflict, which can be ideological as well as material, it would still represent a
radical improvement in the way international relations are conducted. For example, Kaysen
has recently argued that this might be one of the most potent explanations in the reduction of
the incidence of major warfare after the second world war (Kaysen (1990)).
Secondly, the spread of economic interdependence would act as a disincentive for conflict
because states would want to retain the gains extracted from their economic relationship. In a
similar way as ancient Greek city-states exchanged hostages in order to guarantee the
continuation of an alliance, the mutual gains from free trade would ensure that states refrained
from aggressive moves which could jeopardise them. Since the efficiency gained from
specialisation within an international division of labour are dependent upon the maintenance
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renounce political conflict in order to preserve the benefits that a liberal strategy entails. Not
only, therefore, would states find commerce more efficient, but they would come to cherish
its advantages to a point in which they could modify their preferences toward a more co-
operative bias (Rosecrance (1986); Keohane and Nye (1977)).
Lastly, the «spirit of commerce» would also modify preferences toward a more conciliatory
stance, acting in an indirect as well as in a direct form. Montesquieu wrote of the «doux
commerce» which would foster a more gentle approach toward other nations. Adam Smith
highlighted that «commerce and industry have gradually introduced order and good
government and, with these, the liberty and security of individuals» (Smith (1776/1981),
4/iv). According to Cobden, free trade was «the great panacea which, like a beneficial medical
discovery, will serve to inoculate the healthy taste for civilisation in all the nations of the
earth» (Cain (1979)). More recently Schumpeter, criticising the classical Marxist view that
capitalism brings about imperialism, argued that, on the contrary, capitalism fostered
international trade and understanding while imperialism was a relic of a pre-capitalist and
aristocratic past incompatible with the rational search for profits of the modern bourgeoisie
(Schumpeter (1919/1951)). In other words, international trade would facilitate domestic
political development, which would then modify state preferences toward a more peaceful
disposition.
By implication, this strand of liberalism suggests that each factor which is likely to increase
trade between states is also going to bring about a strong incentive for the solution of political
conflict. In particular, since the commodity composition of a free market economy is, in the
short term, constant, the main policy prescription is that of reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade, possibly through a RTA, so as to eliminate obstacles to the strengthening of
economic interdependence. The typical example of the connection between RTAs and the
amelioration of international relations is the process of European integration (Deutsch et al.
(1964); Haas (1958)). After centuries of war, the creation of the European Economic
Community, and earlier of the European Coal and Steel Community, was explicitly designed,
among other objectives, to overcome the Franco-German and other continental rivalries. If the
vital industries and the economic prosperity of each country depended on the continuation of
exchange with the others, another aggression would become suicidal or, at least,
counterproductive. After four decades, the integration of European economies has reached a
point in which conflict is utterly unthinkable, thereby creating what has been termed a
«security community» (Deutsch et al. (1957)). Although other reasons, such as the democratic
institution of European states or the role of outside powers like the Soviet Union and the
United States, may contribute to the explanation of this remarkable achievement, it is taken
for granted that it constitutes an instance of the connection between economic
interdependence, and the institutions which help to bring it about, and political cooperation.
The Western European experience has therefore become a model for export and the
proliferation of regional agreements which has recently occurred in almost every region of the
world has been often geared to replicate the political, as well as the economic, successes of
the European Union. Some of these experiments, such as the Mercosur in Latin America and
the ASEAN in South East Asia, have already brought some encouraging results both in terms
of increased trade and of more co-operative international relations, thereby strengthening the
expectation of a positive correlation between RTAs and peace.
42. Theoretical Limits of the Standard Argument
The expectation of a connection between an increase in the number of RTAs and an increase
in the prospects for peace and collaboration among members has, however, not been
confirmed by the African case because, as will later be shown in detail, the high institutional
density of the continent has not been accompanied by any significant reduction in political
conflict either within or between states. This can be due to three types of reasons, relative to
the economic environment, domestic politics and the international system.
Firstly, from the economic point of view, the connection between trade and peace could still
be theoretically valid but it may simply be inapplicable to the African case because local
RTAs have not (yet) produced a sufficient amount of trade to reach a critical threshold. This
may be either because the sectoral compatibility between African economies is insufficient, or
because trade agreements have been more trade diverting than trade creating in establishing
high external tariffs, or because insufficient attention has been given to the infra-structural
and market requirements for an effective use of liberalisation. In other words, the connection
between trade and peace may not be linear as low values for trade may not necessarily
correspond to a significant or noticeable improvement of the political situation. Only after a
critical point would economic advantages from international exchange constitute a sufficient
political incentive. This type of relationship may be due to the fact that while the volume of
trade is a continuous variable, political issues constitute a more discrete, often binary one, as
political alignments between allies and enemies tend to be dichotomous (Gowa (1994)). As
the following section of this paper demonstrates, African interdependence is still timid and
underdeveloped, especially if compared with that of the OECD members. Furthermore, most
exchanges tend to take informal if not illegal forms, making their impact harder to evaluate.
In other words, the African case would not necessarily falsify the general proposition of the
standard argument, because the prescriptions of the latter have not been put in practice, but it
would point to the fact that interdependence must reach robust levels before any political
consequence can be expected.
Secondly, the connection may be more complicated than often argued, because it may require
other elements which are equally important for the result. These prerequisites may be taken
for granted in other areas but may also be lacking in Africa. In particular, the standard
argument assumes that, since a free trade policy is in the long run interest of all, states will
translate that general interest into policy, so that the incentives of interdependence will
constrain all states to refrain from political conflicts which may damage them. However, this
assumption does not consider the fact that some domestic political systems may fail to
produce a policy which is in the general interest, especially if, as in the African case, state
institutions are weak and vulnerable (Holsti (1996)). In other words, an open and democratic
political system may be as important for the development of economic interdependence as the
mere production of RTAs, as argued, for example, by the neo-Kantian democratic peace
literature (Doyle (1986); Russett (1993); Panebianco (1997)). Given the precarious nature of
most African domestic regimes, it may be this political prerequisite, rather than any structural
economic condition, which is needed for economic interdependence to develop and to bear its
political fruits.
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interest, because it favours all consumers with lower prices and it allows producers to
specialise in those sectors for which they enjoy a comparative advantage and a higher
efficiency, it may not necessarily be equally in the interest of all. In particular, producers and
employees in non competitive sectors may experience short term losses as they have to
reconvert to more productive enterprises. As emphasised by Olson in his classic work on
economic development and decline, these groups have often both the incentive and the
opportunity to influence state policy for their advantage, even at the expense of the general
interest (Olson (1982)). The interests of concentrated groups are often more intense than the
diffused interests of the majority, as their very existence as economic actors in their
traditional sectors may be in jeopardy. Although their interests as consumers and as part of the
whole community may lie in a liberal policy, their protectionist interests as part of their
unproductive economic sectors are in fact likely to be prominent both because they affect
their immediate economic welfare as well as because their identification with a smaller group,
in which their membership is crucial, is likely to be stronger than that with their community
as a whole, in which their membership is simply one among many. Furthermore, since they
are minority groups, their smaller numbers, compared with those of the general public, also
give them an organisational advantage as it is easier for them to overcome problems of
collective action. Given the fact that political action is costly, each individual actor has an
incentive to let others shoulder the burden of upholding a common interest, hoping to enjoy
the benefits without paying the full amount of the costs. Since in larger groups the individual
share of benefits is smaller because it must be divided into a higher number of parts, the
probability that it will be sufficiently large to justify action is smaller than in smaller groups,
in which the individual share of total benefits is larger. Small and intense interest groups may
therefore be capable of hijacking state policy toward a protectionist course and away from the
liberal economic policy which would benefit the majority (Snyder (1991)).
A recent study of trade policy in the Western world has shown that, even in developed states
with a long standing liberal tradition, protectionist interest groups are capable of sabotaging
the pursuit of a free trade strategy if international economic policy is not considered salient by
the body politic (Verdier (1996)). Unless the issue in question is considered important in the
political debate, the wider interests of the community are likely to succumb in front of the
efforts and resources of pressure groups on the government. In Africa, where the channels for
public debate either in parliament or in the media are much less developed, it is much more
likely that concentrated interests groups, in the form of dominant ethnic groups, bureaucratic
cliques and financial interests, are capable of resisting and overcoming the calls for a more
efficient and open economic strategy by the general public. Either the government is too weak
to overcome the entrenched position of local potentates, or it even colludes with them
exploiting its privileged position to distort the most efficient and fair allocation of economic
benefits. In other words, a free market approach is likely to require a free political debate as a
basis for its sustainability. Without it, it may incur in the risk of being an empty façade for the
perennial struggle of concentrated interests groups in the pursuit of their narrow advantage.
On the other hand, as an interesting study by Brawley has suggested, the shortcomings of
democratic decision-making can be even more problematic in a non democratic setting
(Brawley (1993)). Even if at the mercy of interest groups, democratic governments have at
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and desires of the majority. Conversely, autocratic governments can dispense with this
objective trial and can rely on the more subjective instruments of propaganda and populist
manipulation, in which free trade may be presented in less benign forms. In particular, given
the absence of majority rule, interest groups may easily gain an access to political decision-
making which is disproportionate to their narrow membership, forming what the economic
historian Alexander Gershenkron called a cartelised system in which political and economic
elites collude at the expense of the general public (Gerschenkron (1962)). The only way in
which an economic interest may gain long term benefits larger than in a free trade system (in
which efficiency is optimised) is by extracting large rents from the government at the expense
of others. These rents may take the form of monopoly rights, subsidies and protective tariffs
granting larger profits to privileged groups than in a truly open system. In the African case,
this tendency may be reinforced by the commodity composition of industry, in which the
overwhelming importance of agriculture and mining and their reliance on the physical
possession of territorial or extraction rights granted by the government facilitates the
allocation of rents. Other rents which are common to the African environment are the
maximisation of custom revenues (often as high as a third of total government income) by
bureaucratic interest groups as well as the large informal economies, which are run by local
groups placed near frontiers and are based on smuggling and other illegal forms of trade, such
as arms and drugs.
At the international level, some other political conditions are necessary. Interdependence may
otherwise bring more mixed results than often recognised, fuelling political conflict as well as
cooperation, if applied in the wrong circumstances. Not only would the African situation need
further political development before the expected political externalities from interdependence
take hold, but it may also have to face some negative externalities too. In particular, this is the
case if the states feel vulnerable and may want to resist the loss of control that an open
economy entails. The African situation may thus be blocked into a vicious circle in which
states do not liberalise their economies because they do not perceive immediate advantages
larger than the potential costs, but they do not perceive immediate advantages because they do
not trust the system enough to liberalise.
Interdependence is often not a fully reciprocal exchange, because the relative importance of
the relationship to each party is often asymmetric. If one actor is much smaller than the other,
the importance of their relationship is likely to be a larger fraction of its total economic
activity, with the consequences that it may be more dependent on the relationship than the
other. As shown by Albert Hirschman in his classic study on German economic policy in the
inter-war years, this asymmetry may be manipulated for political reasons by the stronger
actor, inducing the weaker actor either to accept domination or to resist it by reducing the
intensity of the relationship (Hirschman (1945/1980)). In the African case, in which at least
two regions witness the presence of an actor larger than its neighbours (S. Africa and Nigeria)
it may be the case that regional agreements are not geared to develop interdependence as
much as to reinforce a regional hegemony, leading the smaller actors to be sceptical or to seek
alternative relationships with more distant partners.
Interdependence may not only fail to resolve political conflict, but it may be even conducive
to it, if developed in the wrong political circumstances. Interdependence may produce, as the
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nations have resolved their most important political difficulties, but its effect may be more
uncertain between states which are openly in conflict. Interdependence may in fact even
exacerbate conflict in certain particularly conflictual circumstances, because it may provide
an extra stake for contenders to fight over and because it may be perceived, by a state
concerned about another state’s aggressiveness, as a dangerous vulnerability to be reduced,
even at the cost of expanding the existing political conflict. In other words, in order to
develop its beneficial effects, interdependence requires a previous minimum of political
stability, which may be lacking in Africa both at the national and international level. Without
this prerequisite, interdependence may deepen conflict rather than cooperation, because it
makes political relationships –even negative ones- more intense. As Waltz has argued, «the
most violent civil wars and the bloodiest international ones have been fought in arenas
populated by similar peoples and whose affairs were tightly linked together» (Waltz (1971)).
The African continent, in which civil wars are much more common than international ones,
and in which international wars are often fought for the control of mineral and informal
economies’ rents, seems to fit this pessimistic description. The paradox is well described by
the process in which international economic institutions, instead of producing peace by
developing interdependence, are increasingly used for military peacekeeping operations
which have little to do with their original purposes and which emphasise conflict management
rather than, as in the standard argument, conflict prevention.
3. The Economic Limits of RTAs in Africa
The first regional characteristic which may inhibit the benign political consequences of
economic interdependence has to do with the insufficient development of international trade,
which is partly due to structural conditions and partly due to the fact that RTAs in SSA have
often been developed for purposes other than economic exchange. The theories of regional
integration provide some guidelines as to the relationship between the characteristics of the
agreements and the likely benefits or costs for the participating countries. In effect, as we will
see below, the experiences of SSA confirm most of the predictions of the models—and hence
why we should not have expected in various cases any particular benefit for the joining
countries—. This shows how the purpose of the regional arrangements consummated in
Africa has only partially been economic and has been in several cases mainly political.
As Langhammer (1992) shows, the larger the share of intra-regional trade in total trade for the
member countries before the setting of an RTA, the more likely trade creation will dominate
trade diversion. In other words, the greater the existing trade links, the less likely trade will be
diverted from low-cost firms outside the region to higher-cost firms within the region
[Radelet, (1997)]. According to the evidence presented by Yeats (1998), SSA intra-trade
accounted for about 12 per cent of the (whole) region total exports in (1995, up to 8 per cent
in 1989. In particular, Yeats shows that established regional arrangements have not
contributed to this increase, as their share of intra-trade was at best constant.
Given the importance of existing trade links, a consequent conclusion is that neighbouring
countries should be natural candidates for RTA’s. The evidence for SSA confirms this [Yeats,
(1998)]. «The origins of exports in African intra-trade appear to be highly concentrated. The
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20 per cent. On the import side, the importance of intra-regional trade varies markedly across
countries-it accounts for less the 2 p r cent of Kenya’s imports to over 50 per cent in the case
of Seychelles.» Most importantly, «that very little or no intra-trade occurs between countries
that are ‘geographically distant’ (like those of the East as opposed to the West Coast of
Africa) may indicate that transport and other logistical barriers to intra-trade are more
important than often acknowledged.»1
Tariffs and differences in cost structures of firms in different member countries also play a
role. Some of the African RTAs have been informed by “old regionalist” perspectives, and
their retention of high external tariffs has produced distortions likely to offset the advantages
of lower internal tariffs. On the other hand, in the newer agreements, the higher the pre-
agreement initial tariff between member countries, the greater the room for trade creation.
Lowering tariffs between members is likely to increase trade, leading to the replacement of
high cost goods previously produced by protected domestic firms with low cost goods from
more efficient firms in the region. Both the case of SACU and the bilateral trade agreements
between South Africa and Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe confirm this [Yeats, (1998)].
In 1995, for instance, 65 per cent of Mozambique export to SSA was directed to the SACU
area, while 80 per cent of its imports came from that same area. In the same year, 91 per c nt
of total Zimbabwean imports from SSA came from SACU, and 69 per cent of total Zambian
imports from SSA came from SACU. Yet, it appears that SACU and Southern Africa in
general are particular cases in which the overly dominance of one country (South Africa)
alters the picture completely. 2
In terms of goods and sectors, the evidence is equally telling. According to Bhagwati (1992),
whenever goods produced by member countries are not close substitutes for goods previously
imported from the rest of the world, trade diversion should be small. So, we should first look
at what products do African countries trade with each other and then see whether there is any
regional integration effect. Mineral fuels obviously dominate intra-African trade (between one
third and one half of total exchange). Conversely, African intra-trade in machinery and
transport equipment accounts for less than 4 per cent vis-à-vis a three quarter share of total
SSA imports. In general, as Yeats (1998) points out, «available data show that very little
intra-trade occurs in non-oil products that are of primary importance in Africa’s total
imports».3
                                         
1 As Bhagwati (1992) has pointed out, other factors, such as geo-strategic alliances, colonial links, and
complementarity of production can play a more relevant role in determining trade flows. This structural
characteristic of African economies is partly the result of the policy of valorisation of resources for
export adopted by the previous colonial powers, and subsequently aggravated by the failure of African
governments’ industrialisation policies aimed at replacing dependence upon raw material exports,
introduced after independence. It has considerably complicated the liberalisation of trade at the
regional level, given that the economies that should be integrated all produce similar products rather
than complementary ones (Foroutan, (1993: 252-254).
2 One of the characteristics of the SACU agreement is its asymmetry in favour of South Africa. On the
other hand, one of the real benefits for the small members has been the elimination of lobbying and
rent-seeking in the small members, given that all trade policy decisions are (mostly) taken by South
Africa.
3 Also, the role of rules of origin as a barrier for intra-regional trade should be mentioned. Bhagwati’s
spaghetti-bowl phenomenon may be part of the explanation of the little effect these RTAs had in intra-
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African intra-industry trade. Some theoretical and empirical analyses conclude that a high-
level of intra-industry trade should play an important role in the success of a RTA. Cross-
country production sharing (often involving intra-industry trade)-a from of «regional
globalisation»-leads to fuller integration into regional and global markets and may favour
industrialisation and economic growth. Yet, it appears that «almost no intra-industry trade
occurs among SSA countries, or between Africa and developed countries. This implies that an
activity that is often associated with regional integration is not taking place» [Yeats (1998)].
The effects of regional integration may be difficult to judge only in terms of tariffs or trade
flows, and yet these are ultimately the benchmarks for evaluating an RTA’s performance. In
general, the greater the geographic size of the RTA and its share in world trade, the greater the
scope for trade creation and the smaller the room for trade diversion [Robson (1987),
Langhammer (1992)]. Likewise, the broader the sectoral coverage of the RTA, the greater the
potential for exploiting a comparative advantage in some products by member countries.4
What is the overall evidence on RTA’s in SSA? Radelet (1997) concludes that «RTA’s
involving developing countries have failed to promote trade or industrialisation, or to result in
significant economic gains for member countries». Langhammer and Heimenz (1990) could
find no case of RTA in the developing world contributing significantly to trade expansion or
economic growth. Within SSA, only SACU, according to Foroutan (1993), has achieved any
significant goods market integration, while CEAO has had a positive impact on trade growth
only initially.
The positive evidence for industrialised countries, by the way, shows that trade creation tends
to be larger the more the countries are integrated even before any regional arrangement. In
poorer countries, economic integration is lacking, product differentiation is limited, and intra-
industry trade is almost non-existing. But more fundamentally, «the failure of many RIA’s in
developing countries can be traced directly to their basic strategy of attempting to foster
industrialisation based on import substitution» [Radelet (1997)]. The evidence shows that
inward-oriented RTA’s have consistently failed to support the expansion of either trade or
industry [Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990), de la Torre and Kelly (1992), de Melo and
Panagariya (1993)].5
This is true for trade policies of individual countries as well, not just for RTA’s. The story of
                                                                                                                          
regional trade.
4 As we said, high pre-agreement tariffs will tend to generate more trade creation. However, if this high
pre-agreement tariffs are transformed into high post-agreement external tariffs, the scope for trade
diversion is relatively more important. Thus, the higher the external tariffs the more dangerous the
RTA becomes. An often quoted reason for the success of the new-regionalism in Latin America is that
it has been accompanied by reductions in MFN tariffs (Lawrence (1999), Ethier, (1998)) and as above
this may be the real problem with the lack of success of RTA initiatives in Africa (i.e., Africa
regionalism still has the characteristics of the “old” regionalism).
5 Indeed, as Langhammer (1992) argues, trade diversion has been an implicit objective of many
RTA’s, whereby members have tried to expand intra–regional trade at the expenses of world trade,
rather than fostering competition. This is the case of SADC, for instance. The problem then becomes
how to distribute costs and benefits of the agreement.
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Mozambique sugar industry might well become a case in point, as it happened with its cashew
industry. An inward-oriented trade policy like the Mozambican sugar policy will develop a
high level of effective protection. This might well lead to excess capacity, which will be
purportedly avoided by barriers to entry (besides the high external tariff). In other words, a
protected oligopolistic sugar industry will develop, at the expense of consumers (and with
what gains in terms of employment?). An inward-oriented policy always appears to protect
vested interests at the expenses of competition.
Although the magnitude of actual trade flows in SSA is certainly larger than the official
figures indicate because of unrecorded flows,6 we can state that the great bulk of trade flows
take place with countries outside the region. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) concluded that
«the fundamental explanation for the failure of regional integration in SSA to increase intra-
regional trade share is to be linked to the inability and/or unwillingness of these countries to
carry out the preferential trade liberalisation measures that represent the prerequisite for trade
creation among integrated markets».
Radelet (1997) concludes that «formal RIA’s have worked best when they have built on
previous steps towards openness and integration». Based on the available data, Foroutan
(1998) also «does not find any systematic relation between regional trade agreement
membership and trade policy. More precisely, [her] paper finds no evidence that participation
in a regional trade agreement necessarily leads to a more liberal import regime.» As Foroutan
points out, «in the absence of a unified all-comprehensive measure to gauge the
restrictiveness of a trade regime, the trade policy stance of a country is ordinarily measured
by a wide variety of indicators, including the incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTB’s), such as
quotas, import license requirements, domestic content requirement, and so forth; the height of
tariff and para–tariff charges; a country’s commitments under the GATT, including the level
and share of tariff bindings; and the black market premium as a proxy for foreign exchange
rationing at the going exchange rate.» But what do the data reveal for SSA? «In Africa, few
countries had undertaken any noticeable import liberalisation until very recently (…). Despite
these reforms, however, the average rate of protection in SSA remains high, at around 22 per
cent with little difference between countries that are classified as belonging to an effective
RIA and those that are not.» [Foroutan (1998)].7
Table 5 in the Annex shows the evolution of SSA countries’ and regional groupings’ degree
of openness over time, measured as total imports plus exports of non-fuel products as a
percentage of their GDP. To the extent that the growth in imports and exports and hence the
openness of a country respond to trade liberalisation, a more rapid increase in the degree of
openness (which deflates growth in trade by that in GDP) indirectly bears witness to the
breath and scope of a country’s trade liberalisation effort. Since data on trade flows are more
readily available than those on tariffs and NTB’s, the information reported in Table 5
                                         
6 See e.g. Barad (1990).
7 Other than Ghana and Guinea, which according to the available data had undertaken a serious tariff
reform in the second half of the 1980s, the average rate of tariff protection in all other countries
remains unchanged in the (1990s. The most important reforms in African countries have occurred only
during (1996, when the seven UDEAC members as well as Benin (a member of UEMOA) drastically
reduced their average tariff and simplified the structure of tariff rates and other indirect taxes thereby
greatly reducing the level and dispersion of the average rate of protection (Foroutan (1998)).
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complements that in Tables 1 to 4 by providing further evidence as to which countries have
liberalised the most their trade regimes. The data show that the degree of openness increased
in the first half of the (1990s compared to the previous five years, but despite this increase,
openness in all countries with the exception of Mauritius has remained well below its high
levels in the second half of the 1970’s.
The evidence indicates that, in the words of Yeats (1998), «problems associated with African
regional trade arrangements are more daunting than is generally recognised. Africa’s non-oil
exports are highly concentrated in a very few products-none of which are important in
regional imports. SSA countries appear to have relatively little to trade with each other» (and
this absence-of-complementarity problem certainly cannot be solved quickly). Not only, but
«African intra-trade is also highly concentrated within sub-regional geographic groups with
almost no trade occurring between East and West Africa». «The range of processed products
African countries export competitively is extremely narrow. Many have a common
comparative advantage in the same items-sugar preparations and refined petroleum products»
and in general «in products accounting for about 5 per cent of total regional imports».
In an economic situation characterised by the considerable fragmentation of national markets,
where as a result of the political priority given to the growth of the national economy,
institutionalised regional integration has been seriously impeded, there has been a noticeable
development of unofficial and/or illegal trade networks. Rather than the result of the
exploitation of the comparative advantages—and thus of the factors of production—of each
state, these networks are a result of those artificial politico-administrative barriers that have
been erected between African states.
The unofficial and/or illegal channels of trade that have developed in many areas of Sub-
Saharan Africa can be explained in terms of the exploitation of the «opportunities offered by
the inequality of the tax, customs and monetary regimes that materialise on both sides of the
border» (Bach, 1985: 1034). So it was thanks to completely artificial economic incentives,
like the exploitation of increased inflation or of a guaranteed higher price to the producer for
the sale of certain products in the neighbouring country, that fully-developed trans–national
trade networks arose. These networks deal not only in local manufactured products but also in
raw materials, as well as in goods imported from outside Africa and then re-sold by one
country to another8.
In Southern Africa one of the sources of regional tension is the flow of clandestine
immigrants entering South Africa from neighbouring countries, and in particular from
Mozambique. Given the economically unbalanced nature of the region, and the failure of
                                         
8 One example of intense cross-border trade is that between Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Due to the
higher prices Ivory Coast cocoa producers are guaranteed by the Stabilisation Office of the Ivory
Coast, during the 1980s and the early ‘90s a close-knit network of producers (from Ghana), carriers
and buyers (from the Ivory Coast) developed along the border between the two countries: through the
sale of Ghanaian cocoa to the Stabilisation Office of the Ivory Coast, all those involved stood to gain
from this speculative transaction. This sale of raw materials was accompanied by the trading of
manufactured goods which could be bought at a lower price in Ghana and then sold in the towns of
the Ivory Coast: this was part of a wider regional trade network which centred around the Nigerian
market, and which used the large Guinea Gulf ports as a source of supplies (Stary, (1999).
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those co-operative projects aimed at guaranteeing a more evenly-balanced form of economic
growth throughout the region, it is inevitable that the country with the strongest economy is
going to attract a growing number of workers from neighbouring countries [Davies, (1996)].
These trade and cross-border migratory flows have a number of negative effects on both the
sustainability and working of regional organisations, and on the economic and political
stability of the states involved. In fact, while on the one hand the «dynamic nature of cross-
border flows promulgates the break-down of economies, the crumbling of state control over
these economies, and the accentuation of their de-institutionalisation», on the other hand it
should be said that «trans–national regionalism challenges the ability of the state to organise
the country, without there being any official questioning of borders (…) the border is still
indispensable for trade (…) hence the opposition of trans–national traders to the
implementation of plans for the liberalisation of trade» [Bach, 1985: 1035)].
In Sub-Saharan Africa there is conflict between attempts at formal regional economic
integration, and the economic and political subjects who wish to exploit the benefits of those
artificial barriers created by national economic development policies9. The cross-border flow
of migrant workers impedes regional economic integration, as is clear from the South African
government’s opposition to the idea of establishing the free circulation of workers within the
SADC. This form of economic integration would in fact lead to an indiscriminate flow of
workers into South Africa, which would in turn have serious consequences for the latter’s
labour market and political and economic stability. Moreover, the very same forms of conflict
may increase profitable trade flows in the African context as a result of the barriers and splits
(in this case political and military) not only between the states within one region, but also
between different areas within the same state.
As a result of the pressure created by the current globalisation of trade and capital flows, there
is an ever-increasing degree of interaction between the national/regional context and the
intercontinental one. This leads to the introduction of certain African countries and regions
into global trading networks, most of which are either illegal (drugs) or illegally managed
(arms). Africa thus finds itself part of the globalisation process, but in a role destined to
increase Africa’s current marginal status. Thus it is clear that continued attempts at official
economic integration become of particular importance within the African political and
economic framework. The creation of effective regional organisations should guarantee the
setting up of standardised tax, customs and administrative regimes at the interstate level,
which in turn represent a fundamental precondition for the development of official regional
trade interdependence [Guillaumont and Guillaumont, (1993: 399-402)].
                                         
9 Political tension arose between Senegal and Gambia as a result of the flow of products which, after
importation into Gambia, was being illegally re-exported to Senegal: in order to try and eliminate the
causes of this flow, an ambitious political objective was set involving an attempt to set up a
Senegalese-Gambian Confederation. However, the Treaty setting up the Confederation failed to
provide any form of compensation or support for the inevitable blow these measures would have for
the Gambian economy as a result of the liberalisation of trade between the two countries and of the
setting up of a TEC, and this constituted one of the principal weaknesses of the format of the
Confederation. As a result of the vehement protests made by Gambian interest groups, the Gambian
government refused to introduce the trade liberalisation measures agreed upon during negotiations,
and the Senegalese-Gambian Confederation ceased to exist (in 1989) (Bach, (1999: 11).
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The structural adjustment policies adopted by African governments from the mid-1980s
onwards, in agreement with the World Bank and the IMF, failed to properly address the
problems of dependency on the exportation of a limited number of raw materials and the
fragmentation of African markets. The paradoxical aspect of the adjustment programmes
introduced in Africa is that whereas they should have eliminated, or at least reduced,
(artificial) fragmentation of the African economic systems [Robson, (1993: 336)], what they
actually did was to accentuate the barriers and divisions between these systems, thus further
destabilising the existing processes of regional integration. The inclusion of the Sub-Saharan
African countries in the global market, which was the main objective of adjustment policies,
thus came about in a distorted fashion. It in fact led to the growing economic marginalisation
of African states. The main features of this marginalisation are the weakly diversified
productive base and the relatively marginal flow of direct foreign investment into Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The theoretical assumption underlying the structural adjustment programmes is that the best
economic solution in terms of overall well-being is the unilateral, non-discriminatory
liberalisation of trade by each country. This assumption, however, has prevented reform plans
from taking into consideration the regional aspects of the political and economic interaction
of the countries in question. The nationally-oriented character of structural adjustment plans
has meant that the possibility of co-ordinating national reforms at the regional level has been
overlooked. This, in turn, has led to a time lag between the macroeconomic reforms
introduced in different countries, and subsequently to the creation of further artificial trade
and financial barriers between these countries. It has also meant that wider, more positive
measures in support of regional economic organisations have failed to be introduced:
measures such as the funding of regional infrastructural programmes, the creation of
structural and compensatory funds, the supplying of technical assistance to regional
institutions, which together could have helped towards the real reconstruction of African
economies, making it possible not only to level out existing economic imbalances among the
various members of regional economic groupings, but also to ensure the stronger presence of
these countries in the global economy.
Over the last few years the debate over regionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a
realignment of previously opposing positions. The World Bank and the IMF no longer have
such strong reservations about regional integration, and have come to accept the idea that this
integration may be seen as a temporary economic reorganisation phase in a wider process
leading to full global integration. The African subjects and institutions involved, together with
a growing number of donor countries, however, have come to accept the idea that
regionalisation should not, and cannot, in any way constitute a means to permanent protection
from the rest of the world, and thus cannot replace healthy national macroeconomic policy. In
fact, rather than a reciprocal reconciliation of opposing positions, it seems that there has been
a separation of the questions on the agenda. The undergoing processes of economic
globalisation and political regionalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, though concurrent, are
considered to belong to two different spheres: the first to the economic sphere and the second
to the political sphere. As far as the economic aspects are concerned, this separation has led to
debate over regionalisation being transformed into a mere question of the fastest liberalisation
of trade tariffs possible. The questions of the industrialisation of individual countries, and of a
more evenly-balanced form of structural development within the grouping, have thus been
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largely overlooked [Oden, (1999: 158-162)]. This can be clearly seen from the
implementation of the Cross Border Initiative, and from the current phase of re-elaboration of
regional integration plans within the SADC.
The Cross Border Initiative consists of a programme funded by the World Bank, the IMF, the
African Development Bank and the European Union, and involves fifteen Eastern and
Southern African countries. It guarantees various forms of funding to the governments of
those countries that unilaterally introduce staggered reductions in trade tariffs as agreed with
the international donors in question. This measure is supported by international institutions of
vital importance within the African context, and cuts across the currently-existing regional
economic organisations (EAC, COMESA and SADC). It has an agenda, centred exclusively
around the liberalisation of trade, that is superimposed on that of the individual regional
groupings. The Cross Border Initiative may therefore contribute to weaken the chances of
achieving a form of integration that takes account of the structural inequality between the
countries within a region, and between them and the rest of the world, but may also
exacerbate the legal and political uncertainty of the already complex dynamics of
regionalisation in Eastern and Southern Africa [Keet, (1994: 10-16)].
The SADC was designed to further cooperation between those countries surrounding South
Africa in certain specific economic sectors: transportation, communications and
manufacturing. This was designed to act directly on the root causes of underdevelopment in
Southern Africa, and thus to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa and on the
industrialised nations in general. Regardless of the degree to which this was achieved or not,
the unique nature of such a plan was severely challenged by the entry of South Africa into the
SADC. In fact, the normalisation of relations between South Africa and its neighbours
marked a new phase in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. The pressure
exercised by globalisation on South Africa and its neighbours, at the very moment that the
entire region was faced with the economic and political effects of apartheid, led to the
questions of trade liberalisation and support for the private sector coming to the fore, albeit
amid great political turmoil. As a result, regional cooperation got relegated to a rather
ambiguous role, and it still remains to be seen whether trade liberalisation and economic
cooperation can be pursued at the same time [Oden, (1999: 166-171)].
4. State Weakness and its Effects
The above-mentioned economic factors are paralleled by a series of political factors that have
contributed towards hindering the implementation of regional economic integration plans in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Without these political prerequisites, economic interdependence remains
underdeveloped and its political effects remain small. These factors include the intrinsic
weakness of African states, the conflicts that have arisen within the latter and that have often
taken on regional proportions, and the institutional fragility of the very regional economic
organisations.
Once independence from colonial domination had been achieved, African political leaders
lost no time in claiming the complete sovereignty of their countries in continental and
international circles. The OAU’s founding Charter, adopted in 1963, declared that the borders
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inherited from the colonial period were to remain untouched, and sanctioned the non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states. These two principles constituted the
cornerstones of interstate relations in Africa, with but a few exceptions, at least until the end
of the cold war period.
Despite the serious shortage of human and material resources available to the post-colonial
states, with which they had to govern geographical areas characterised by a combination of a
frail national identity and the fragmentary nature of the economy, and in the majority of cases
by weak social infrastructures, recognition of national independence meant that these
countries were at least formally protected from external destabilising factors. This enabled
them to concentrate their energies on the drawing up and implementation of national
economic and social development policies.
However, instead of experiencing economic growth and the re-enforcement of their political
institutions, just a few years after independence these Sub-Saharan African countries found
themselves being sucked into a downward spiral of economic crises and the decline of their
political systems. The failure of development policies led to a crisis of legitimacy for the post-
colonial states, exacerbated conflicts and the competition for access to resources, and severely
hindered the consolidation of democratic institutions. At the same time, the breaking-up of
certain sectors of the state apparatus (the army and the bureaucracy) compromised any chance
of economic development, preventing the formation of an African entrepreneurial class.
Recognition of the principles of the non-modifiable nature of colonial boundaries, and of the
non-interference in the internal affairs of individual states, as sanctioned by the OAU and
accepted to their advantage by the ex-colonial powers and the super powers, the USA and the
USSR, led to a unique situation in Africa. The absence of any real war between African
countries was accompanied by increasing instability within the majority of the same
countries.10
The end of the cold war led to a significant change in conflict in Africa. The disappearance of
the super-power struggle, in fact, meant an end to the option African countries had been given
up to that point of military and economic support from the USSR and the other communist
bloc countries. This in turn led to a drastic reduction in the continent’s strategic importance
for the USA and other western powers. These changes led to the reduction or even the end of
western economic and military aid to numerous African states, and meant that a growing
number of bilateral and multilateral donors were to impose strictly political conditions linked
to democratisation, alongside those macroeconomic ones already part of structural adjustment
programmes, on their granting of economic aid.
While the end of the cold war made it possible to resolve a number of conflicts that had been
going on in Africa for a considerable time, such as those in Southern Africa (with the
important exception of Angola) and in Eritrea, it also led to the explosion of a number of
                                         
10 Of course there were exceptions to this: the most important being the Ogaden war between Ethiopia
and Somalia in 1977-78, Tanzanian army intervention in Uganda in 1979 designed to defeat the brutal
dictatorship of General Idi Amin, and finally the strange situation in Southern Africa which saw Cuban
and South African troops fighting each other in Angola, and the South African army trying to trigger off
a process of military destabilisation within the other countries in the region.
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other, latent hostilities whose root causes had existed for some time in Somalia, in the Congo
(the former Zaire), in Liberia and in Sierra Leone, and it led to the collapse of the state and its
various structures. These conflicts were accompanied by a resurgence of ethnic and religious
conflict in Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi, after a period of apparent détente and peace efforts
which later revealed as a complete failure.
The conflicts that emerged in Africa with the ending of the cold war clearly had regional
repercussions, not only because the flows of refugees and the destruction of natural resources
failed to recognise existing national borders, but also because the various political and
economic players within the different regions often had a considerable role in the
conflagration of the conflict in question and/or are currently involved in trying to resolve the
same conflict.
From the institutional point of view, assertion of national sovereignty and the priority given to
national development, the political, institutional and economic fragility of the African states,
their internal political instability and the survival instincts of the regimes in power, together
with the present degree of conflict throughout Africa, have had numerous effects on both the
institutional framework and the working of the African regional economic organisations.
The priority given by political leaders at the time of independence to state sovereignty and
national economic development has meant that economic organisations have not been given
any super-national powers.
With the one exception of the SACU, where the politically, economically and militarily
dominant country within the region has been granted the power to unilaterally adopt and
modify the customs union rules, Africa fails to offer any examples of super-national
authorities with effective political and economic powers. This weakness is accompanied by
the absence of any mechanisms with which to bring sanctions against those member states
who fail to abide by the treaties and decisions made by regional bodies [Takirambudde,
(1999: 155-158)].
Given that the member states have failed to observe the agreed terms for the liberalisation of
trade, or have not paid the financial contributions due to the community institutions, and that
the latter have no power to penalise such non-fulfilment of obligations, there is no choice left
but to try and exercise unofficial pressure on the countries in question, or in the case of
prolonged inaction, to propose the re-negotiation of the terms of the entire agreement.
Regional economic agreements in Sub-Saharan Africa have thus been characterised by their
purely rhetorical nature, since there is no institutional structure capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of complex objectives such as the creation of a customs union or a common
market.
This institutional weakness of the African economic groupings has been exacerbated by the
overlap in many cases of the roles and membership of the same regional institutions.11 The
reasons for this apparently irrational overlap can still be traced back to the frailty of the post-
                                         
11 This overlap drains increasing financial and human resources from the governments of African
countries (Mulat, (1998: 123).
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colonial states, which despite their claiming full political sovereignty, were forced to seek the
political and economic support of the former colonial powers and thus continued to maintain
their preferential relations with the latter. Thus the North-South axis of regionalisation,
characterised above all by the Franc Zone and the series of agreements between African
countries and the European Union, is superimposed on the plans for integration between
African countries, leading to considerable political tension and paralysing plans for the
liberalisation of trade, as happened in the case of CEAO and ECOWAS.
African countries’ need for international economic aid has led to the search for funding and
technical support for regional organisations and to the setting up of various kinds of regional
project. The system of relations with bilateral and multilateral donors created by the SADCC
during the course of the 1980s, which had guaranteed a considerable flow of foreign finance
for regional projects, particularly in the infrastructural field, became an integral part of the
same organisation which member countries decided they did not want to lose when the idea of
a merger between the SADCC and the PTA was put forward [Carrim, (1994: 21)].
Similarly when fifteen Eastern and Southern African countries, who were already members of
other regional economic organisations, decided to sign the Cross Border Initiative despite the
sheer contradiction between membership of this latter grouping and other similar trade
liberalisation programmes they were already involved in, this was a clear indication of their
need to hold on to the political and economic support of the countries who were financing the
Initiative.
The failure of those industrialisation policies aimed at reducing reliance on imports that the
majority of African governments adopted during the 1960s and ‘70s has led to the further
weakening of the same African countries and has inevitably contributed towards impeding
plans for regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, because in an increasingly critical
economic situation, African governments were reluctant to lose the customs revenue from
such imports. The working of the same clearing houses set up by a number of African
economic organisations was hindered by the fact that the member states did not wish to lose
the foreign currency that interregional trade could provide them with [Aly, (1994: 48-58)].
The problem of the indispensable nature of customs revenue and of poor compliance with the
trade liberalisation calendar established at the time the founding agreements were signed,
points to a further weakness in the majority of regional integration plans in Africa: a form of
integration based on the mere abolition of trade barriers has failed to ensure that those states
involved in the integration process proceed to eliminate customs tariffs as provided for in the
treaties. The existence of compensatory mechanisms, or even of structural funds (perhaps
financed by donor nations), designed to guarantee the reorganisation of the industrial base of
member states, should have favoured the creation of regional markets, by reassuring the
governments and economic organisations of the member countries that the benefits of
economic integration would have been fairly distributed among all the countries. This would
have prevented any further exacerbation of the already-existing imbalances in available
resources and economic development within the various regions [Aly, (1994: 58-62)].
This kind of situation facilitates the task of those interest groups who risk losing the benefits
of political and economic fragmentation, given that the aspirations of the political classes are
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not great enough to give proper direction to the regional integration process, and there are too
few groups offering support for economic integration within each of the member countries12.
The growth of conflict within a number of Sub-Saharan African countries has constituted a
further hindrance to regional economic integration, because of both the destruction it has
brought about, and of the destabilising effects it has had on neighbouring countries as a result
of the waves of refugees leaving the war-ravaged states, the illegal arms traffic across borders
and the creation of unofficial trade networks (dealing in gold and diamonds, for example).
The outbreak of hostilities across Africa during the (1990s, together with the growing
awareness among various African and non-African players of the potential negative effects of
conflict on development, have led to a re-thinking of the role played by African regional
economic organisations, with increasing emphasis being placed on their need to assume
responsibility for the prevention and resolution of such conflict.
5. Conflict Prevention and the New Role of Regional Economic Organisations in Sub-
Saharan Africa
The end of the cold war saw the beginning of a process whereby the international and
continental strategies adopted in the attempt to resolve conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa were
redefined. The outbreak of violent conflict within numerous African countries during the
(1990s not only contributed towards destabilising the region, but in some cases led to the
collapse of the state’s central institutions. This was accompanied by a growing reluctance on
the part of the industrialised world to send peace-keeping forces into Africa and other parts of
the world, given the uncertain results obtained by such operations. The outcome of this was
that both African and external decision-makers agreed on the need to develop Africa’s own
capacity to resolve such conflict.
The effectiveness and sustainability of outside multilateral intervention in situations of crisis
arising around the world were quickly to come under fire as a result of the failure of
humanitarian/military intervention in Somalia. In fact, the US decided to lead multilateral
intervention in Somalia in order to resolve the humanitarian crisis resulting from the civil war
that had been ravaging the country since 1989, and that had led to the fall of Siad Barre’s
regime and the subsequent collapse of state institutions. The difficulty the multilateral force
found itself in was to catch the mission’s military leaders unprepared, and in the end they
were forced to abandon their previously-established objectives [Vogt (1997)]. This failure
was to lead to heated international debate over the inadequacy of current peace-keeping
operations. As regards the specific case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the failure of intervention in
Somalia has led to a reappraisal of conflict-resolving strategies available to the international
community. The outcome of this analysis has been the abandoning of the interventionist
option on the part of western powers, and increased emphasis on the role of the OAU and of
other African regional organisations in the prevention and resolution of conflict.13
                                         
12 See the case of the Senegalese-Gambian Confederation.
13 Another factor that has contributed towards the caution expressed by western diplomacy derives
from the different views France and the US have about the nature of intervention and about the setting
up of special African crisis-intervention forces. The separate interests of the two countries have led to
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The idea of finding “African solutions to African problems” leads to the questioning of the
principle of non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs, one of the cornerstones of the post-
colonial African order, and it has therefore called for an integrated and complex approach.
The policy of “African solutions to African problems” formulated during the (1990s involves
three main features: the introduction of conflict prevention mechanisms and processes
throughout Africa; a growing involvement of African regional economic organisations in the
resolving of member countries’ domestic conflicts; and the introduction by western countries
and the UN of military exercises, part of peace-keeping operations, involving the armies of
numerous African countries.
Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the (1990s, debate among African states
considered the possibility of setting up an Africa-wide mechanism for the prevention and
resolution of conflict. This debate was sparked off by the growing awareness of African
countries that the new post-cold war international scenario meant both advantages and
disadvantages for Africa. In fact, while the end of the cold war put an end to the unconditional
political, economic and military aid to dictatorial regimes that hid strategic interests and could
help to resolve certain conflicts, it also meant the risk of Africa’s marginalisation. Prompt,
effective solutions had to be found by the African nations if they were to re-launch their
economies, but this was conditional upon a furthering of their capacity to guarantee the
control and resolution of conflict. Given the problems encountered by the OAU in trying to
reform the conflict control-and-prevention system it had previously set up, the period between
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the (1990 saw the Africa Leadership Forum conduct
a profound analysis of the reasons behind the African crisis and of possible answers to it. This
reflection eventually led to the signing of the “Kampala Document” in May (1991 by eight
African heads of state and government and a consistent group of representatives from various
African organisations. This document proposed the organisation of a Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). Based on the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSSDCA was designed to mark the beginning of
cooperation among African countries with regard to two crucially important, interdependent
questions: security and economic development. [Nathan, (1992; Zartman, (1996)].
Doubts about the chances of actually putting the Kampala Document’s proposals into
practice, and about the relationship between the institutions envisaged by the Document for
the prevention and the resolution of conflict, on the one hand, and the measures adopted by
the OAU on the other still exist. The Africa Leadership Forum project was accompanied by
debate within the OAU on the consequences the new international political scenario would
have for the OAU’s role in the management of conflict in Africa. In June 1993, African heads
of state and government meeting in Cairo set up a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution within the OAU. The OAU heads of state see the new
mechanism as operating within a pyramid of roles in the prevention and resolution of conflict,
                                                                                                                          
considerable disagreement at times, especially after the Kivu crisis that followed the upheaval in the
Great Lakes region due to the genocide in Rwanda, and that openly triggered off hostilities once again
in what was Zaire at the time. The difficult situation had put France, the historical “gendarme” of the
region, in an extremely difficult position, while at the same time the USA displayed growing interest in
events that involved, and that continue to involve, one of the regions giants, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, as well as other countries such as Uganda, South Africa and Nigeria (Huliaras (1998).
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involving both the UN, the OAU and the African sub-regional organisations. The pyramid is
to be headed by the UN, given its role as world peace-keeping organisation. The base of the
pyramid, on the other hand, is to be formed by the African sub-regional organisations, whose
job it is to safeguard peace and security as far as possible within their regions.  The new OAU
Mechanism is to co-ordinate the sub-regional organisations’ activities at the continental level,
and therefore to act as intermediary between the latter and the international activities of the
UN [Keller (1996)].
Despite the innovative nature of the OAU Mechanism, specifically designed as it is for the
prevention and resolution of conflict in Africa, with respect to the informal diplomatic
activities traditionally undertaken in Africa, the scarce resources made available to the
Mechanism, together with many countries’ reluctance to exchange information, have
prevented the Mechanism and the OAU from playing any effective part in the resolution of
existing conflict within Africa [Cilliers (1999) Olonisakin (2000)]. Conflict management in
Africa in the (1990s was therefore distinguished by the growing role played by sub-regional
organisations in the resolution of conflict. The security gap created in Africa after the end of
the cold war, which persisted despite multilateral intervention by the international community
and by the OAU, has been filled by the African sub-regional organisations, and in particular
those of an economic nature. African regional economic organisations are thus undergoing a
process of political transformation as a result of which they are becoming the primary agents
of political and military stability in Africa. This transformation is particularly evident in the
cases of the ECOWAS and the SADC.
Military intervention in Liberia by the ECOMOG (the Monitoring Group set up by the
ECOWAS in 1990 to supervise implementation of the Banjul Agreement) constituted the first
case of direct military intervention by a group of African states in the domestic affairs of an
individual state within that region. Intervention began in August 1990, and ended in July 1997
with presidential elections being held, subsequently won by Charles Taylor. ECOMOG’s
intervention in Liberia is seen as a model for future peace-keeping operations in Africa, which
should see the increasingly direct military involvement of African regional bodies. In truth, a
number of objections could be made concerning the manner by which intervention took place.
As we will shortly see, similar reservations may also be advanced in cases of intervention by
the SADC countries in Lesotho and in the Congo. First of all, although the conflict clearly had
regional implications as a result of the political and economic support given to the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor by numerous countries within the region
[Kwesi-Aming (1997)], and as a result of the politically and economically destabilising
effects civil war in Liberia had, or could have had, the kind of military intervention carried
out by the ECOWAS lacked any kind of legal grounding [Hutchful (1998)]. Secondly, it
could be said that rather a case of the co-ordination and pyramidal division of responsibilities
between the international level (UN), the continental level (OAU) and the sub-regional level
(ECOWAS), the Liberian case was one of military intervention by a regional institution that
had intervened in a situation where the two higher multilateral levels, for various reasons,
were prevented from acting. The UN’s acknowledgement of ECOMOG intervention came
only later, while for the entire duration of the conflict, the UN played a largely marginal part
(with its sending of the UNOMIL) compared with that played by the ECOWAS [Malan
(1999)]. The same could be said of the role played by the UN in ECOMOG’s subsequent
intervention in Sierra Leone from 1997 onwards. Thirdly, ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia
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was a very complex matter from the political point of view, and was subsequently to lead to a
clear division between the region’s French-speaking and English-speaking countries that put
the existence of the entire organisation at risk [Vogt (1996)]. Fourthly, ECOWAS’ principal
bodies exercised very little control over intervention, which gave national military contingents
and their commanders considerable freedom of action. On the one hand, this meant that
military operations could be extremely flexible, thus eliminating the usual bureaucratic
problems involved in peace-keeping operations, but on the other hand it gave the various
national contingents the chance to pursue their own aims within the context of the Liberian
conflict [Hutchful (1998)]. Lastly, there has been widespread criticism of the sustainability of
such prolonged, costly operations in the future. In fact, it has been said that the ECOMOG
intervention in Liberia was made possible by the absence of truly democratic political systems
in the majority of the region’s countries, and in particular in Nigeria. The democratisation
process that has recently begun in Nigeria may thus contribute towards impeding future
costly, large-scale military operations such as those conducted in Liberia [Hutchful (1998)].
In Southern Africa, SADC member countries led two military interventions during the course
of 1998, one in the Democratic Republic of Congo and one in Lesotho. These two operations
were clearly very different as a result of the different contexts in which they took place, and
the different countries that undertook them. Nevertheless, as in the case of ECOWAS’
intervention in Liberia, both operations not only marked the potential political role that the
SADC could play in Southern Africa, but also raised a series of questions concerning the
sustainability and nature of this new conflict prevention and resolution role.14 The
interventions in the Congo (ex-Zaire) and in Lesotho have led to political polarisation within
the SADC between Zimbabwe and South Africa. This risked compromising not only the
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, but more generally speaking the entire process of
political and economic integration which the SADC was aiming for. Furthermore, both
interventions have underlined the absence of a clear regulatory framework within which
military peace-keeping or peace-re-enforcement operations in Southern Africa are to be
conducted. The lack of any pre-defined standards against which the legality of operations may
be controlled compromises control over the way intervention takes place, and thus contributes
                                         
14 In June (1996, after a long debate between the region’s governments, the SADC summit of heads of
state, held in Gaborone, decided to set up an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. However, this
decision remained a dead letter because the member governments were split on the questions of the
political leadership of the organ and its institutional status within, or parallel to, the SADC (Malan
(1998). Faced with this deadlock, the region’s countries did not hesitate to organise military
intervention in member states of the SADC, which in turn created a situation of considerable
uncertainty with regard to the very future of the Organ itself. In August (1998 the government of
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe militarily intervened on the side of Laurent Kabila’s government in the
civil war that had flared up once again in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While a subsequent
meeting saw the SADC defence ministers express their support for the intervention by the three
member countries, the president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, openly contested the line taken by
Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the Congo, claiming that the SADC had not given its unanimous
support to intervention (Malan (1999)). A few days later, however, Mandela changed his mind and
agreed that military intervention in the Congo had been conducted under the auspices of the SADC.
Surprise shown at this change in his position was shortly to find an explanation, when the South
African army intervened in Lesotho in September (1998. In fact, South Africa quickly affirmed that this
was a multilateral SADC operation, aimed at re-establishing order in Lesotho, even though the
subsequent arrival of troops from Botswana failed to confirm this legitimisation of intervention (Malan
(1998)).
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towards the climate of insecurity within the region [Neethling (1999)].
The cases of ECOWAS and of SADC show how regional economic organisations that have
failed over a long period of time to achieve their economic objectives, are currently taking on
a new, increasingly important role in the prevention and resolution of conflict in their
respective sub-regions. This new role has led African regional organisations to initiate a
process of institutionalisation of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. Apart from
the SADC, IGAD and ECOWAS (which in 1998 set up its own Regional Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution), also COMESA and EAC are considering
the possibility of creating conflict resolution mechanisms.
The above analysis shows how Africa is no exception to the global trend that emerged during
the 1990s, which saw regional organisations being given increasing responsibility for the
prevention and resolution of conflict between, and within, countries in the region. In
particular, in the case of Africa it has been the regional economic organisations that have gone
beyond their plans for economic integration, and have taken on the political task of managing
interstate and domestic conflict. This transformation has been inspired by the idea that
political stability and the absence of conflict are indispensable pre-requisites for the economic
development of African countries. However, this transformation of the role of the African
economic organisations has raised a number of questions.
First, despite military intervention, it has still proven impossible to guarantee long-term
regional stability if the crisis of the African state is not also dealt with. The weakness of the
structure of the African state requires a series of capacity-building measures based on
funding, training and technical assistance from donor countries. The building of a stable
regional framework would undoubtedly facilitate the re-launching of the African economies:
however, stabilisation plans risk remaining a dead letter if they are not accompanied by the
democratisation of the states making up that region [Lyons (1998), Nathan (1998)].
Secondly, criticism of the cardinal principles of the inviolability of those national borders
inherited from the colonial past, and of the non-interference in the domestic affairs of
individual states, which held up the post-colonial order in Africa and enabled more effective
peace-keeping intervention operations to be conducted, also carries certain risks. ECOMOG
intervention in Sierra Leone, and SADC intervention in the Congo and in Lesotho, have
shown just how militarily powerful countries have not hesitated to intervene in other counties’
domestic conflicts. The questioning of the principles on which relations between African
states are based would therefore seem to underline the need to formulate new, clear
regulations and principles for military intervention by African countries in the domestic
conflict of another state. The fact that in the majority of cases the countries that conducted
such intervention operations were hardly democratic regimes, is a further cause for concern
with regard to the democratic effects of such operations, on top of that of the future
sustainability of costly, prolonged military intervention.
Thirdly, the new role of the African regional organisations in the prevention and resolution of
conflict may negatively effect the economic role they are expected to play. The tension that
has arisen between member countries of the same regional organisation has repeatedly put the
existence of the organisation itself at risk. Therefore the question of whether conflict
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prevention and resolution mechanisms ought to be kept separate from economic structure
needs to be given careful consideration. The very weakness of the administrative structure of
such regional organisations, together with the scarcity of funds available to them, are two
good reasons why caution should be taken when considering any further extension of their
existing roles.
Fourthly, the debate on regional conflict prevention mechanisms in Africa, together with
those peace-keeping capacity-building programmes funded by foreign donors, only take into
consideration the military aspect of security. This constitutes a serious limitation to any
strategy that wishes to guarantee medium- and long-term political stability at the regional
level. In fact, insecurity in Africa is not so much caused by military threats as by economic
and social factors, such as the economic polarisation between countries or within individual
countries, which in turn has socially destabilising effects (e.g. flows of migrants), or by
climactic and geographical factors (e.g. drought or the scarcity of water). Given the
destabilising effects these factors have on the countries’ political systems, together with their
regional dimension itself, any conflict-prevention strategy that ignores them will be incapable
of providing a sufficient degree of security for the re-launching of development policies
[Booth and Vale (1995); Swatuk and Omari (1997)].
CONCLUSIONS
The number of RTAs in Africa has exploded in the last decade and they are increasingly seen
as promoters of political stability. This paper offers some reflections on the question of why
the increase in RTAs in SSA has not produced the expected beneficial effect in terms of
domestic and international political stability. The most prominent role taken by regional
economic institutions has in fact been in military rather than economic aspects and this may
be both a cause and an effect of the difficulties of establishing genuine economic integration
in Africa. On the one hand, the political role of RTAs may be too ambitious and it
demonstrates the complex agenda of African governments, which were not interested
exclusively in economic development but had political objectives in mind as well. On the
other hand, the fact that regional organisations are engaged in peacekeeping testifies the
failure to provide a more stable environment to continental politics.
In the paper we advance two different (though related) reasons why the positive link between
economic interdependence and political stability observed in other parts of the world (Europe
and Latin America) may not work in Africa. First, the level of intra-regional trade within this
blocks has probably never reached the necessary threshold to abandon political conflict for
economic interdependence. Second, the level of institutional development in Africa has not
reached the necessary minimum level for economic interdependence to translate into political
stability. These are two very interesting hypothesis that have not been tested in the empirical
literature, which has always assumed that the link between trade (economic interdependence)
and peace was a smooth continuous phenomenon. To test for threshold effects on the level of
trade between countries and on the level of institutional development for peace should
certainly be in the future research agenda on RTAs in Africa.
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As has been argued throughout, the reasons for the failure of RTAs in Sub-Saharan Africa
may be numerous. Firstly, economic conditions in most African countries may not allow for a
full exploitation of the efficiency gains of a more open economy, implying a threshold effect
for the relationship between economic interdependence and political stability. Secondly, the
precarious nature of domestic institutions may frustrate the development of adequate
economic policies and favour the rent seeking of bureaucratic interests, protectionist interest
groups and entrepreneurs in illegal trades. Thirdly, persistent regional instability jeopardises
the operation of economic mechanisms and it focuses minds on other, more urgent, priorities,
postponing the pursuit of an authentic free market. On top of these problems, many African
RTAs are hindered by poor institutional design, which has led to rhetorical statement rather
than concrete reforms.
One important problem with RTAs in Africa is also the one of re-distribution of tariff
revenues. Typically, in SSA countries more than 30 per cent of government revenue comes
from trade taxes: tariff preferences, trade diversion and deflection may impose an important
constraint on the viability of these agreements and may be the source of conflicts among
members of RTA (the SACU redistributive systems is an example of the potential problems
that may exists, in particular with landlocked countries). Besides, issues like infrastructure,
water, migration, or technical assistance, show that there well may be much more efficient
ways of achieving peace than RTAs (leave aside the high benefits that regional cooperation in
these areas may bring).
The conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis are that the intellectual efforts of the
research and policy-making communities should take into account a more complex and
integrated approach, considering political as well as purely economic aspects, and focussing
on those prerequisites which may have allowed economic regionalism to produce positive
results in other areas, but which may be still lacking in SSA. Mechanical and automatic
application of development strategies which have worked in different environments may even
be counterproductive in the specific African contest. Given the political and economic
importance of relations between individual African countries and developed states and
associations, such as the European Union, which are often more significant than regional
bilateral links, these considerations should inform the making of Western policy with respect
to SSA. Outside countries and organisation may in fact be in a privileged position to help
break the short circuit of poverty and instability which has not allowed Africans, so far, to
realise their full potential.
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ANNEX
Table 1. Total Intra-Group Import Trade as Percentage of Total Imports,
Non-Fuel Trade, 1965-95
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 1995
ECOWAS
CEAO
UEMOA
5.20 5.49 5.13 6.75 6.74 8.83 8.91
UDEAC 1.88 4.21 3.17 2.27 2.84 4.23 4.43
PTA
COMESA
7.92 7.32 4.54 4.76 4.38 5.00 6.22
SADCC
SADC
8.57 3.87 1.81 3.10 3.22 3.32 4.32
CBI 10.22 9.95 5.42 5.26 5.10 5.81 6.72
Source: Foroutan (1998)
Table 2. Total Intra-Group Export Trade as Percentage of Total Exports,
Non-Fuel Trade, 1965-95
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 1995
ECOWAS
CEAO
UEMOA
6.36 8.86 9.46 10.12 8.60 10.80 8.91
UDEAC 1.92 3.97 2.31 1.69 3.00 2.21 2.32
PTA
COMESA
7.21 7.786 7.566 6.992 5.298 6.5 7.78
SADCC
SADC
6.07 3.09 2.51 3.55 3.13 3.78 4.68
CBI 8.26 10.20 7.89 7.52 6.40 8.36 6.72
Source: Foroutan (1998)
Table 3. Export Trade Intensity of Various Regional or Bilateral Groupings with Each Other,
Non-Fuel Trade,1965-95
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 1995
ECOWAS
CEAO
UEMOA
19.3 30.0 30.1 36.1 38.7 64.6 49.7
UDEAC 9.9 25.3 14.0 10.6 23.0 25.8 30.2
PTA
COMESA
6.4 8.8 13.9 11.8 10.7 15.6 19.9
SADCC
SADC
9.1 6.1 12.1 13.3 13.9 18.6 25.9
CBI 10.8 17.2 18.2 18.9 19.4 28.8 24.0
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Source: Foroutan (1998)
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Table 4. Total World Exports to African Regional Groupings as Percentage of Total World Exports
Non-Fuel Trade, 1965-95
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95 1995
ECOWAS
CEAO
UEMOA
0.33 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.18
UDEAC
PTA
COMESA
1.13 0.89 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.42 0.39
SADCC
SADC
0.67 0.50 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.18
CBI 0.76 0.59 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.28
Total 2.89 2.28 1.50 1.54 1.27 1.08 1.03
Source: Foroutan (1998)
Table 5. The Evolution of Openness in Various Countries in SSA
Openness = (Total Exports plus Imports minus fuels) / GDP
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95
Benin 0.20 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.24
Ethiopia na Na na 0.22 0.20 0.16
Ghana na Na na Na na na
Guinea na Na na Na na na
Kenya 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.37 0.46
Madagascar 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.28
Malawi 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.51 0.57
Mauritania 0.45 0.68 0.00 0.55 0.90 0.92
Mauritius 0.56 0.71 0.85 0.80 1.03 0.98
Nigeria na Na na Na na na
Sierra Leone Na na Na na na
Tanzania na Na na 0.24 0.24 0.47
Uganda 0.31 Na na 0.28 0.15 0.19
Simple Average 0.38 0.48 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.48
Countries Belonging to an effective PTA
Cameroon 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.31 0.23 0.29
Cote d'Ivoire 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.58
Senegal 0.38 0.45 0.58 0.63 0.45 0.32
South Africa na na na Na na na
Zimbabwe 0.19 na na 0.33 0.41 0.60
Simple Average 0.37 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.41 0.45
Countries in state of war
Burundi 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.32
Rwanda 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.26
Somalia na na na Na na na
Sudan 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.23
Zaire 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.16 na
Simple Average 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.27
Source: Foroutan (1998)
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Table 6. The Value and Share of Intra-Trade in Regional Sub-Saharan African Groups
Value of intra-trade in US$ millions
Regional Grouping 1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993
CEPGL 3 2 9 7 12 14
ECCAS 29 98 118 168 156 169
ECOWAS 86 693 1,026 1,539 1,501 1,699
MRU 1 7 4 3 1 1
PTA 306 693 407 837 676 746
SADC 100 107 198 356 299 338
UDEAC 22 84 85 139 120 129
UEMOA 54 476 431 625 502 578
Intra-trade as a percentage of total exports of the grouping (%)
Regional Grouping 1970 1980 1985 1990 1992 1993
CEPGL 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.1
ECCAS 2.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.5
ECOWAS 3.0 10.2 5.3 7.9 7.4 8.6
MRU 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
PTA 9.6 12.1 5.5 7.6 6.0 7.0
SADC 5.2 5.1 4.7 5.2 4.2 5.1
UDEAC 4.9 1.8 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.3
UEMOA 6.4 9.9 8.7 12.0 9.3 10.4
CEPGL - Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire)
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda,
Sao Tome and Principe, Zaire).
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’ Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).
MRU - Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone).
PTA - Preferential Trade Area (Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe -- data for Namibia and Swaziland are unavailable).
SADC - Southern African Development Community (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe -- data were unavailable for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland)
UDEAC - Central African Customs and Economic Union (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon)
UEMOA - West African Economic and Monetary Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’ Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo.
Source: Yeats (1998
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